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In this paper, we examine the mutual and competitive relationship between 
climate security and food security in the context of expected 
macroeconomic growth till 2030. We analyze two approaches aimed at 
reducing Greenhouse Gas emissions: the European Biofuels Directive 
(EBD) and a reduction in meat consumption. The implications for 
developing country food security, as captured by the impact on food prices, 
food consumption and land demand are evaluated for both approaches, and 
the implications for climate security are evaluated by the impact on land use 
emissions and total emissions. The impacts of the two approaches are 
examined using data from the results of the EUruralis2 project (WUR, 
MNP, 2007) and regression techniques. 
 
The analysis finds a small positive relationship between the EBD and food 
prices for some developing countries. The results of the food consumption 
analysis show that food consumption is lower under the biofuels scenarios 
suggesting that the income effect is insufficient to offset the increases in 
food prices. Land use emissions increase in some regions from the EBD but 
total global emissions appear unaffected. The shift in global consumer 
preferences away from meat appears to have negative effects on food 
security and positive effects on climate security. However lower food 
consumption in the developing countries is due to the method used to bring 
about shifts in consumer preferences; a tax on meat products.  
 
KEYWORDS: Food security, climate security, biofuels, Computable General Equilibrium 
 
1. Introduction  
At the recent World Food Summit in Rome, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon stated that “Food security and climate change are deeply 
interconnected” and “There can be no food security without climate 
security” (United Nations, 2009). With the world population projected to 
increase to 9.1 billion by 2050, mostly in developing countries (FAO, 
2009a) and the production of some crops expected to fall by up to 49% in 
some developing countries (Nelson et al., 2009), the question of how to feed 
the world in a sustainable way is both pertinent and challenging. 
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This paper examines the mutual and competitive relationship between 
climate and food security for selected developing countries in the context of 
expected macroeconomic growth to 2030. Two approaches to managing the 
challenge of climate security are considered: the European Biofuels 
Directive (EBD) aimed at reducing carbon emissions from fossil fuel use 
and a shift in consumer preferences away from meat consumption which 
reduces methane emissions from agriculture as well as reducing the demand 
for grazing land and feed crops.  
 
The paper begins with a brief background section followed by the objectives 
of the paper and the data and methodology. The results of the impacts of the 
EBD and changes in consumer meat preferences on food security and 
climate security are given in the results section followed by final remarks. 
 
2. Background  
Governments are faced with a dual policy objective of food security and 
climate security: erasing hunger by 2030 whilst reducing Greenhouse Gas 
(GHG) emissions across the board. Emissions from the agricultural sector 
accounted for approximately 14% of total Greenhouse Gas emissions in 
2004 (IPCC, 2007). The challenge in meeting this dual objective is large 
given the context of rising food and energy demand and slower growth in 
agricultural yields in some regions due to climate change. The FAO projects 
that food production needs to increase by 70% by 2050 to meet the growing 
demand (FAO, 2009a). The FAO proposes that the expansion in food 
production necessary to meet the increased demand should come from a 
20% expansion in land area and 80% improvements in yields concluding 
therefore that a significant increase in investment is needed to bring about 
the improvements in agricultural technology and yields. The increase in 
agricultural production implies changes in land use from non-agricultural 
land (e.g. forest) to agricultural land which releases CO2 sequestered in the 
soil. Policies that secure the sustainable development of the agrifood sector 
are therefore needed. Any policy to reduce emissions and feed the world 
must offset the additional emissions that arise from the drivers of population 
and income growth and urbanisation (FAO, 2009a) as seventy percent of the 
world are projected to be living in an urban setting by 2050, compared with 
49% currently (FAO, 2009a).  
 
3. Objectives 
The objective of this paper is to explore the mutual and competitive 
relationship between climate security and food security in the context of 
expected macroeconomic growth till 2030. The analysis presented in this 
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paper gives an indication of the likely interactions between biofuels policy 
and consumer meat preferences and food and climate security. Both biofuels 
and reductions in meat consumption are considered as methods to reduce 
Greenhouse Gas emissions and ensure a sustainable future. However there 
are concerns that these efforts will have negative effects on food security in 
developing countries.  
 
4. Data and Methodology 
The impact of the European Biofuels Directive and changes in global meat 
preferences on food and climate security is examined using the results of the 
EUruralis2 project. EUruralis2 is a well known and well respected study 
that covers ex-ante projections for 36 regions from 2001 to 2030 for a range 
of scenarios. The results are generated using the linked LEITAP-IMAGE 
model where LEITAP is a socio-economic global Computable General 
Equilibrium model and IMAGE is a model of the global environment 
including emissions and land use change. The results are used as a dataset 
for an econometric analysis of the impact of the EBD and directly to 
examine the impact of a shift in consumer meat preferences. The focus of 
the EUruralis2 project is the European Union but it also includes several 
developing regions: Brazil, Rest of (South and Central) America, China, 
Rest of Asia (including India), North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and South 
Africa. As the majority of the world’s poor live in these regions, these seven 
regions are the focus of the analysis presented in this paper. 
 
The four key EUruralis2 scenarios were built around two uncertainties 
concerning the future world development (Westhoek et al., 2006): 
globalization and state regulation level of the world economy. These four 
scenarios vary along two dimensions; the level of globalization ranging 
from regional to global cooperation, and the degree of government 
intervention varying from low to high regulation. As options on future trade 
and agricultural policies are uncertain and because different policies might 
be relevant for each key scenario, we analyze various policy options within 
each of the four key scenarios. These policies differ by degree of trade and 
domestic support liberalization and biofuel policy options (Table 1). The 
combination of key scenarios and alternative policy assumptions leads to 34 







EBD impact identification 
 4 
The impacts of the EBD on the dependent variables of food prices, food 
consumption, land demand, land use emissions and total emissions are 
identified by a series of linear regression models. The movements in the 
dependent variables are explained by the policy dummies and 
macroeconomic assumptions (GDP) specified for 34 EUruralis2 scenarios 
including two dummies associated with the EBD. Therefore, there are 
following explanatory policy variables in the equations: A1, B1, B2, C1, 
C2, C4, G1, G2, E2 and E3 (see Table 1). The estimated parameters 
associated with EBD dummies therefore shows the impact of EBD on 
analyzed variables.  
 
The dependent variables and GDP in the food security regressions are 
expressed in percentage change from 2001 to 2030. The dependent variables 
in the emissions regressions are expressed as cumulative change between 
2000 and 2030; however, the cumulative change in GDP is taken from 2001 
as this is the base year of the LEITAP model. The regression equations are 
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares and general-to-specific approach in 
which all possible explanatory variables are included initially and the model 
is refined until all variables are significant and the model is a good fit of the 
data.  
 
Meat preference impact identification 
The econometric approach conducted for the EBD cannot be extended to the 
meat preference shift as changes in meat preferences are embedded within 
the scenario storylines (B1 and B2) in such a way that the individual effects 
cannot be distilled. Therefore, so called ‘subtotals’ calculated by the 
LEITAP model that show the effects of meat preferences shocks on B1 
Scenario results are analyzed directly. In this way, the isolated impact of a 
shift in consumer preferences leading to reduction in meat consumption in 
2010 to 2030 in all countries can be identified for eight scenarios within 
macroeconomic context covered by the B1 scenario storyline..  
5. Results 
The Impact of European Biofuels Policy  
Explicit biofuels scenarios are included in EUruralis2 allowing the effect of 
the biofuels policy to be easily identified. Whilst the biofuels scenarios of 
5.75% (E2) and 11.5% (E3) blending are considered as medium and high 
ambition in the context of the EUruralis2 scenarios, the scope of the policy 
is quite small on a global scale as it only applies to the EU and with 
relatively low blending levels. Finding impacts of biofuels on food prices 
and land use emissions for this size of biofuel policy would suggest that an 
expansion of the policy, either in terms of mandatory blending levels within 
the EU or the adoption of biofuels directives by other countries, would have 
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greater effects. At this stage, the analysis of the impact of biofuels on food 
prices and emissions in developing countries is exploratory. 
 
The Implications of the European Biofuel Directive for Food Security 
The results of a series of cross-sectional regressions aimed at evaluating the 
impact of biofuels policy on a range of food security indicators are 
presented in this section. The implications for food security are evaluated by 
the impact on food prices, land demand and food consumption. The 
competing claim for land from food, feed and fuel use is evaluated by 
examining the impact of the biofuels policy on food consumption. 
 
The results are reported for the key coefficients of interest: 5.75% biofuels 
blending (E2) and 11.5% biofuels blending (E3); other significant 
explanatory variables are included in each of the regressions but are not 
reported here. The R2 value is reported for each regression as an indication 
of the goodness of fit of the model. Since the LEITAP model is 
approximately linear in percentage changes of the variables, the goodness of 
fit is very high for most of the equations   
 
A series of cross-sectional regressions are specified to estimate the impact 
of biofuels policy on agricultural food prices in seven developing 
countries/regions. The results of the agricultural food price analysis are 
presented in Table 2. The fit of the models is good as shown by the high R2 
values in each case. An R2 of 1 indicates that all of the observed variation in 
food prices is explained by the macroeconomic storylines and policy 
variables. This is in line with the deterministic nature of the dataset: the data 
are created from successive model runs where the difference between 
scenarios is due only to changes in policy and/or macro variables. 
 
A priori, an expansion in the demand for biofuels is expected to lead to 
increases in food prices. As land is a relatively scarce resource, the extra 
land required to increase crop production for biofuels comes at a higher 
price. The higher crop price is transmitted to food prices either through 
direct input costs (e.g. grain) or through indirect input costs (e.g. feed grain 
costs that affect the price of meat). [TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
The regression results shown in Table 2 suggest a small, positive 
relationship between mandatory biofuels blending in the EU and food prices 
in some developing countries. Whilst a positive relationship between EU 
biofuels policy and food prices is indicated in the results, not all the results 
are statistically significant: only the coefficients for Brazil and Rest of 
America are statistically significant in the case of a 5.75% blending level. 
The coefficients for these regions remain significant when the blending 
target is doubled and the relationship between the EU biofuels policy and 
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food price increases also become significant for the Rest of Asia, North 
Africa and South Africa. The analysis suggests that the EU biofuels policy 
does increase food prices in some developing countries examined here and 
that the effect becomes stronger (and more statistically significant) with 
higher required biofuels blending shares in the EU. The analysis of values of 
estimated parameters shows that an impact of the (limited) biofuel policy is 
relatively small, i.e. economically not significant, for the majority of the 
analysed regions. The food price increase due to the implementation of the 
European Biofuels Directive (EBD) with an 11.5% mandatory blending is 
about 1% for Brazil and lower than 1% for other regions except North 
Africa where an 8% increase in food prices is predicted; although this result 
is only mildly significant. The observed increase in Brazilian food prices is 
in line with the role of Brazil as a key producer of biofuel crops.  
 
The impact of biofuels policy on the demand for land is shown in Table 3. A 
priori, it is expected that increasing biofuel demand in the EU will increase 
demand for land in the developing countries covered here. [TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
The fit of the models is good for all regions and in line with a priori 
expectations. The results show that increasing the blending share of biofuels 
in the EU increases the demand for land in Brazil at the 5.75% blending 
level by 2.4%. The results for the other developing countries at the lower 
blending level are statistically and economically insignificant.  Therefore, it 
seems that to a large extent, 5.75% blending levels in the EU may be 
achieved by more intensive use of land (including land set aside) in the EU 
itself and does not affect the developing countries other than Brazil. 
 
Increasing the mandatory blending share in the EU to 11.5%, expands the 
demand for land in all countries; with significant increases in land demand 
occurring in Brazil (5.2%), Rest of America (1.3%), Rest of Asia (3.9%) 
and South Africa (0.02%). The EBD has no impact on the agricultural land 
demand in China, South Africa and North Africa. Note however, that the 
use of biofuel by-products for animal feed (which are not included in the 
EUruralis2 analysis) is likely to reduce the effect on land expansion. 
 
The above analysis shows that an EU biofuels policy is likely to put 
upwards pressure on land and food prices in some developing countries. The 
overall impact of the EU biofuels policy on food consumption (measured in 
changes in quantities, valued in constant prices) is shown in Table 4. With 
increasing land and food prices, the a priori expectation is that biofuels will 
lead to a small reduction in food consumption in developing countries. 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
The results of the food consumption regressions shown in Table 4 are 
broadly in line with a priori expectations; increased use of biofuels leads to 
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small reductions in food consumption in some developing countries. A 
small significant decrease in food consumption is observed for Brazil at the 
5.75% blending level. The introduction of 11.5% blending in the EU leads 
to statistically significant reductions in food consumption in most countries 
with the largest decreases observed in North Africa (8.1%), Rest of Asia 
(2.8%) and South Africa (1.7%). The negative relationship between biofuel 
use and food consumption is statistically significant for all regions except 
Sub-Saharan Africa which may be due to the amount of land available for 
expansion in this area. 
The Implications of the EU Biofuels Directive for Climate Security 
The implications for climate security of the EU biofuels policy are evaluated 
in this section by examining the impact on land use emissions and total 
worldwide emissions. The results of a series of cross-sectional regressions 
are presented for the key coefficients of interest: 5.75% biofuels blending 
(E2) and 11.5% biofuels blending (E3). The results of seven regression 
equations examining the impact of biofuels on land use emissions are shown 
in Table 5. The fit of the emissions regression models is less good than that 
of the previous regressions since data concerning emissions are only 
indirectly derived from the LEITAP assumptions via the IMAGE model. 
The regressions still explain between 78% and 100% of the observed 
variation in land use emissions (column R2). A priori, the biofuels policy is 
expected to increase land use emissions in areas which produce biofuels. 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
The results of the emissions regressions show few significant coefficients 
for the EBD suggesting that the variation in macroeconomic storylines and 
other policies predominantly explain the observed changes in land use 
emissions. Low level EU blending requirements (5.75%) only lead to 
significantly large increases in land use emissions in Brazil (0.4%). Higher 
levels of mandatory blending (11.75%) further increase land use emissions 
in Brazil (3.1%) and also in Rest of America (1.4%). These results suggest 
that whilst the mandate is implemented in the EU, the effect is to increase 
land use emissions in regions that are the main producers of biofuel crops. 
 
Land use emissions are however, only one part of the story. The overall 
impact on emissions of the EBD depends on the relative sizes of the 
reduction in energy emissions and any increases in land use emissions. 
Moreover, the overall impact on emissions cannot be evaluated at a country 
level as energy emissions reductions are likely to occur in developed 
countries with land use emissions occurring in developing countries. The 
results of two regressions examining the impact of EU biofuel policy on 
total emissions are shown in Table 6. Results are given for the world level to 
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show the overall impact on global emissions and for Brazil as an example of 
the developing country level impact for a biofuel producing region. 
 
The effect on global total emissions of the EBD are not statistically 
significantly at both blending shares levels suggesting that the policy has 
little impact. Furthermore, the specification of the regression is not sensitive 
to the omission of the biofuel dummies supporting the observation that the 
EU biofuels policy is not a key driver of total global emissions. The 
majority of the observed variation in total emissions can be ascribed to the 
different aspects of the macroeconomic storylines. At low levels of 
mandatory blending, the EBD does not appear to significantly decrease or 
increase total global greenhouse gas emissions. [TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
The results for Brazil however show a positive and significant relationship 
between EU biofuel policy and Brazilian total emissions at both blending 
levels. This is in line with expectations as Brazil is a key producer of biofuel 
crops. The introduction of 5.75% blending shares in the EU is associated 
with a 0.3% increase in total emissions in Brazil whereas a higher 11.5% 
blending requirement in the EU increases Brazilian total emissions by 3.1%.  
The Impact of Shifts in Meat Preferences on Food & Climate Security 
The implications of a global shift in consumer preferences away from meat 
consumption for food and climate security are examined in this section. The 
results presented are averages over eight B1 scenarios thus the global 
context in which the preference shift takes place is one of global co-
operation in which there is free-trade and environmental and social goals 
exist alongside profit-driven economic growth. The impact of changes in 
meat preferences on land-use and total emissions cannot be evaluated using 
the results of the IMAGE model as the individual effect of the meat 
preference shift cannot be isolated. An attempt to evaluate the likely impact 
on emissions is made at the end of the section. 
 
The shift in consumer preferences is implemented in the LEITAP model 
using a tax on meat consumption. The effect of the tax is to reduce meat 
consumption and shift consumption towards other goods. The use of a tax in 
this context is instrumental rather than policy based; it is a mechanism to 
induce consumers to shift their consumption away from meat. A tax on meat 
products of 18% is introduced from 2010 to 2020 and a further 18% is 
levied from 2020 to 2030 in all countries. The size of the tax increase is 
chosen to bring about a 5% reduction in meat consumption by households in 
each period. The increase in the price of meat from the introduction of the 
tax is clear from Figure 1. [FIGURE 1 HERE] 
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The price of the All Food composite rises for all developing countries when 
the meat tax is introduced but by less than the increase in the price of meat 
due to the lower share of meat in total food consumption. The share of meat 
in total food consumption varies between 11% in Rest of Asia and 29% in 
China in the LEITAP model. Overall, the smaller increases in the prices of 
all foods suggests that the prices of Other Food (non-meat food) fall when 
the price of meat increases. The increase in the price of all commodities is 
less than that of the food price increase as developing countries spend 
between 15% (Brazil) and 47% (Sub-Saharan Africa) of total expenditure 
on food products. The share of food expenditure in total expenditure in these 
regions compares with a global average of 12%. 
 
As with the analysis of the biofuels policy, the impact on prices is only one 
side of the story as there may also be income effects. Indeed, the shift in 
consumer meat preferences leads to small increases in income of between 
0.3% for Brazil and 1.2% for North Africa (as calculated from the results of 
the LEITAP model) but they are insufficient to offset the increase in the 
prices of all commodities and total consumption falls. The impact of 
changes in consumer meat preferences on the consumption of meat, all food 
and all commodities is shown in Figure 2. (measured in changes in 
quantities, valued in constant prices). The introduction of the tax has the 
desired effect and reduces the demand for meat by between 8% (North 
Africa) and 10% (Sub-Saharan Africa). [FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
Inducing a shift in meat preferences by introducing a tax on meat products 
increases the price of food and reduces consumption. The extent to which 
this increases the number of malnourished people in developing countries is 
difficult to assess without an assessment on the impact on calorific intake, 
however increasing the economic barrier to food consumption through 
increased food prices is likely to increase the malnourished population. Note 
that the negative impact of shifting meat preferences on food consumption 
are driven by the means of achieving the shift: the meat tax. The impact of 
changing consumer meat preferences on food security should be evaluated 
using other means such as advertising to achieve the shift in order to gain a 
full understanding of the likely effects on food security. 
 
A priori, a reduction in the global consumption of meat is likely to reduce 
the demand for land for cattle rearing and grazing and for growing animal 
feed, although this may be offset to some extent by increased demand for 
cropland. The implications of a shift in meat preference on the demand for 
land are shown in 
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Figure 3. [FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
As expected, the demand for land for meat production falls for all regions as 
result of changes in consumer preferences towards lower meat consumption, 
except South Africa which experience a small increase of 0.2%. The largest 
reductions in land demand by the meat sector are experienced by the meat 
producing regions of Brazil (3.1%) and the Rest of America (2.7%).The 
demand for land for other food production also falls in most regions as the 
reduction in land for producing animal feed offsets any increase in land 
demand for non-meat foods. The reduction in the demand for land in Brazil 
and Rest of America is partly due to a fall in meat exports from these 
regions of 5% and 6% respectively. The increase in the demand for land for 
meat production in South Africa is due to an anomalous increase in meat 
exports from this region. This results should be viewed with caution and 
warrants further investigation. 
 
The overall picture from a global reduction in meat consumption is one of 
reduced pressure on land. Unlike biofuels where the overall impact on 
emissions is uncertain because it depends on the relative magnitude of two 
countervailing effects, the direct and indirect effects of reducing meat 
consumption on emissions work in the same direction. Firstly, the number 
of animals being reared is reduced which reduces methane emissions and 
the need for land conversion. Secondly, the reduction in the demand for 
animal feed reduces the pressure on land and land-use emissions. The 
increased demand for non-meat products may offset some of the reduction 
in land demand to some extent but the overall pattern is likely to be one of 
lower emissions with lower meat consumption.  
6. Final remarks 
An evaluation of the impact of biofuels on food prices in seven developing 
countries/regions suggests that an EU biofuels policy may lead to increases 
in food prices in some regions. The demand for land increases as the 
demand for biofuels increases, notably in Brazil as a key supplier of biofuel 
crops. An EU biofuels policy is associated with increased land use 
emissions in some regions but at the global scale preliminary analysis 
indicates that the EU biofuels policy does not have a significant impact on 
total emissions either positively or negatively.  
 
The finding of a positive relationship between EU biofuel policy and food 
prices is balanced by an awareness of the link between agricultural prices 
and farm income in developing countries such that increasing prices cannot 
be viewed as conclusively increasing malnutrition. Changes in agricultural 
prices have an opposite effects on producers and consumers and further 
analysis of the impacts on these two groups is required in addition to an 
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evaluation of the changes in prices relative to changes in income. It is likely 
that trends in urbanisation will lead to the impact on consumer prices being 
an important part of future research alongside the impact on farm incomes. 
The results of the food consumption analysis are however more concerning 
as food consumption is lower under the biofuels scenario suggesting that 
any income effect is insufficient to offset the increases in food prices and 
that there is competition for land use between food, feed and fuel. 
 
The shift in global consumer preferences away from meat brought about by 
a tax on meat is likely to have negative effects on food security and positive 
effects on climate security. Food consumption of non-meat products is 
likely to be higher in some regions when global preferences move away 
from meat consumption but overall consumption is lower due to the higher 
prices faced by consumers. The demand for land is lower in almost all 
regions when consumers switch away from consuming meat. The fall in the 
demand for land is less than the reduction in meat demand suggesting land 
use extensification. A reduction in meat consumption could be an important 
tool in achieving lower emissions as it is likely to reduce both methane and 
land use emissions. Achieving the preference shift may however be 
challenging. The increase in food prices associated with the reduction in 
meat consumption is attributable to the tax mechanism that is introduced to 
generate the changes in consumer preferences. Although a direct tax on 
meat consumption may be politically unrealistic, the increase in the price of 
meat from the tax can be viewed as the cost of bringing about the shift in 
preferences, perhaps through education and awareness. Other policy tools 
for bringing about a change in consumer preferences for meat should be 
considered as an alternative to the increase in meat prices examined here. 
 
The results presented in this paper are based on the scenario analysis 
conducted for the EUruralis2 project. The modelling approach at the time of 
the project did not incorporate by-products of biofuel production in 
livestock production. The use of by-products reduces the direct competition 
between food, feed and fuel and introduces a more complementary 
relationship between biofuels and food crops. The use of by-products is 
likely to reduce the impact of biofuels on food prices by reducing the direct 
demand for crops for animal feed and the impact on emissions through 
reducing land expansion. In contrast, the widespread adoption of mandatory 
biofuels blending in countries outside the EU together with higher blending 
shares is likely to put further pressure on agricultural prices and reduce food 
consumption even with by-products. The biofuels policies considered here 
are conservative and apply only to the EU but show that increasing the 
biofuels share from 5.75% to 11.5% already lead to small increases in food 
prices. Further research on global biofuels policies and higher blending 
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shares, together with ‘second generation’ biofuel technology will further 
inform research into the competing claim between food, feed and fuel.  
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Table 1. Specific policy assumptions  
Key scenario assumptions 
A1 high economic growth, increasing population, high agro technology, 
border and market phased out, no bio-energy policy 
B1 medium economic growth, increasing population, high agro technology, 
border support phased out, market support stable, 5.75% blending  
A2 medium economic growth, decreasing population, high agro 
technology, border and market stable, no bio-energy policy 
B2 low economic growth, decreasing population, high agro technology, 
border and market stable, 5.75% blending 
Alternative policy options 
Border support 
G1 full liberalization: in 2010 still market price support, after 2020 all market 
price support abolished; price difference with world market = 0% 
G2 decreasing market price support: in 2010 still market price support, 
after 2020 all price support reduced by 50% 
G3 constant price support: until 2030 unchanged market price support 
Income support 
C1 abolishment of all income support; abolished after 2010 
C2 decreasing income support; budget reduced by 50% in 2030 
C3 stable income support; no change in the budget until 2030 
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C4 increasing income support; budget increased with 50% in 2030 
Biofuel 
E1 low or no ambition on bio-energy - 0% blending, no taxes, no subsidies 
E2 medium ambition on bio-energy - 2010 onwards: 5.75% blending  
E3 high ambition on bio-energy - 2010 onwards: 11.5% blending  
 
Table 2 Impact of Biofuels on Food Prices 
 5.75% Blending 11.5% Blending  
 Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio 
 
R2 
Brazil 0.444*** 9.966 1.109*** 10.760 0.999 
Rest of America 0.101** 2.516 0.357*** 3.840 0.999 
China 0.044 1.168 0.481 1.522 0.999 
Rest of Asia 0.084 0.935 0.635*** 3.045 0.998 
North Africa -0.075 -0.244 8.001* 1.751 0.941 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.184 1.522 0.351 1.260 0.994 
South Africa 0.063 0.653 0.737*** 3.324 0.998 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10%   
Table 3 Impact of Biofuels on the Demand for Land 
 5.75% Blending 11.5% Blending 
 Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio 
 
R2 
Brazil 2.392*** 5.811 5.167*** 14.050 0.999 
Rest of America 0.271 1.476 1.299*** 3.058 0.995 
China 0.006 0.250 0.577 1.581 0.951 
Rest of Asia 0.207 1.680 3.901** 2.162 0.883 
North Africa 0.001 1.201 0.004 1.651 0.999 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.190 0.980 3.033 1.405 0.994 
South Africa 0.000 0.000 0.016*** 5.007 0.996 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10%   
Table 4 Impact of Biofuels on Food Consumption 
 5.75% Blending 11.5% Blending 




Brazil -0.230***     -3.220    -0.616*** -3.756    0.999 
Rest of America -0.039 -0.587    -0.283* -1.832     0.999 
China -0.017     -0.239    -0.545*** -3.405     0.998 
Rest of Asia 0.179     0.455    -2.824***      -3.202     0.998 
North Africa -0.574       -0.860    -8.129***             -5.484     0.995 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.436   0.510 -0.701    -0.369    0.999 
South Africa 0.221   0.554    -1.649*      -1.855     0.999 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10%   
Table 5 Impact of Biofuels on Land Use Emissions 
 5.75% Blending 11.5% Blending 




Brazil 0.373***       4.850    3.108*** 12.130     0.999 
Rest of America -0.035      -0.270    1.443***        3.325     0.983 
China 0.001    0.103    -0.053     -1.353     0.948 
Rest of Asia -0.346       -1.447     -0.644      -0.841    0.776 
 14 
North Africa 0.002* 1.786     0.003     0.778    0.818   
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.328       -1.146      -0.033      -0.036    0.991 
South Africa -0.317       -1.549     -0.247       -0.376    0.965 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10%   
Table 6 Impact of Biofuels on Total Emissions 
 5.75% Blending 11.5% Blending 




World -0.364 -1.199 -0.059   -0.061 0.991 
Brazil 0.325*** 3.217 3.086***   9.168 0.998 
*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 10%   
Figure 1 Impact of Shift in Meat Preferences on Food Prices (% Change, 2010-2030) 
 
 
Figure 2 Impact of Shift in Meat Preferences on Consumption (% Change, 2010-2030) 
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